

The Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn Revisited

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Just fifteen words of his multi-volume *Geschichte der Kriegskunst* did Hans Delbrück, the eminent military historian, devote to the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, giving the opinion that it yields nothing of importance for the history of warfare.¹ This may well be the case. But a battle's contribution to the art of war is not necessarily commensurate with its political significance and, still less so, with the fascination it holds for posterity. Ḥaṭṭīn, a climax in the history of crusade and *djihād*, is replete with high drama: Saladin's calculated thrust at Tiberias, eliciting King Guy's seesaw reactions at Saforie; the weary Franks encircled on the arid plateau during the night that preceded the final battle; the flight of the thirst-stricken Frankish foot soldiers to the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn overlooking the inaccessible waters of Lake Tiberias; the last Frankish cavalry charges almost reaching Saladin, tugging at his beard in agitation; the encounter between the triumphant Saladin and the captured Frankish leaders, with the victor killing his archenemy with his own hand. Small wonder that historians turn their attention to this battle time and again. During the last twenty-five years no less than three major reconstructions have been put forward. In 1964, Joshua Prawer published his "La bataille de Ḥaṭṭīn," which contributed inter alia to the understanding of the Lower Galilee road system at the time of the battle. In 1966, Peter Herde came out with his "Die Kämpfe bei den Hörnern von Hittin und der Untergang des Kreuzritterheeres (3. und 4. Juli 1187). Eine historisch-topographische Studie," the most detailed account of the events offered to date, based on painstaking scrutiny of the sources and the battlefield. In 1982, Malcolm C. Lyons and D.E.P. Jackson dedicated a chapter of their book on Saladin to Ḥaṭṭīn, utilizing for the first time an account of the battle written after the capture of Acre on 10 July 1187.²

The present attempt is a by-product of the Second SSCLE Conference.

- 1 Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, vol. 3: *Das Mittelalter* (Berlin, 1907), p. 421.
- 2 Prawer's article was published in *Israel Exploration Journal* 14 (1964), 160-179; for a slightly expanded English version see his *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 484-500. Herde's article appeared in *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte* 61 (1966), 1-50. The reconstruction by Lyons and Jackson appears in their *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War* (Cambridge, 1982), ch. 16. C.P. Melville and M.C. Lyons have edited and translated Saladin's letter in the present volume, pp. 216-220.



Aerial view of Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn from east (photo by Moshe Milner)

Seeking an appropriate site for the session scheduled to take place at the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn, I went over the terrain with Eliot Braun, the archaeologist, who made me aware of Zvi Gal's survey of the ancient walls along the circumference of the horns and Gal's excavations of an isolated medieval structure on the summit of the southern horn; this led to the identification (or rather reidentification) of that structure with the Dome of Victory that Saladin had erected on the horns following the battle. Later, the Lower Galilee Regional Council asked me to provide a brief description of the battle, which was to be placed on a signpost at the horns on the occasion of the SSCLE conference. Attempting to condense the story into a signpost text of some 200 words I became acutely aware of the limits of scholarly consensus on the issue; but I also came upon some new, or hitherto unutilized, facts. First, I gained knowledge of the considerable progress archaeologists have made in recent years with regard to the ancient road network in Lower Galilee, and especially of the discovery in 1983—just south of *Khīrbat Maskana* and about 1.8 kilometers northwest of *Lūbiya / Lubie*—of the intersection of two Roman roads. Israel Roll of Tel Aviv University, who was the first to realize the importance of this discovery, was kind enough to put at my disposal the evidence (much of which remains unpublished) that he has gathered about the roads of the region; the roads marked on Figure 1 are largely based on his information.³ Second, I learned that discharge measurements of the



3 For a survey of Roman roads in Lower Galilee see also Yig'al Teper and Yūval Shāḥar,

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springs in the region, some of which go back to the 1920s, may shed some light on the events of 3 July 1187. Visits to the ruins of Kafr Sabt and Kh. Maškana—under the guidance of Yossi Buchman and Naphtali Madar of the Allon Tabor Field School—also proved helpful. Finally, I came to realize that a description of the battle which ‘Abd Allah b. Aḥmad al-Muqaddasī wrote on 13 Djumāda II 583/20 August 1187, and sent to Baghdad, and which Abū Shāma later included in his *Kitāb al-rawdatayn*,⁴ should be ascribed to the prolific and influential Ḥanbalī jurisconsult Muwaffaq al-Dīn ‘Abd Allah b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Qudāma al-Ḥanbalī al-Muqaddasī [hereafter al-Muqaddasī]. His father was the Ḥanbalī preacher Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Qudāma who lived under Frankish rule in Djammā‘īl, a village southwest of Nablus, fled in 1156 to Damascus and initiated the exodus of his relatives and disciples to that city. Al-Muqaddasī, born in 1146 in Djammā‘īl, was ten years old at the time of that exodus; he studied in Damascus and Baghdad, and took part—together with his much older brother Abū ‘Umar and his cousin ‘Abd al-Ghānī—in Saladin’s expeditions against the Franks, including that of 1187.⁵ The battle account by this learned refugee from the Frankish Kingdom stands out for its sobriety and factual detail when compared with the florid effusions of the other Muslim eyewitness, ‘Imād al-Dīn, and should be ranked high among the sources on the battle.

By 1187, experience must have taught Saladin that nothing short of a clear-cut showdown would give him victory over the Franks. In November 1177, his deep but largely unopposed thrust into the southern coastal plain of Palestine had ended in resounding defeat at Montgisard; in July 1182 his advance into the Jordan Valley and Lower Galilee had come to a standstill with the inconclusive battle near Forbelet; in August 1182 his fleet and army had failed to take the crucially important city of Beirut by a well-coordinated surprise attack; in October 1183, with the rival armies encamped near copious springs in the eastern Jezreel Valley, he had not been able to provoke the Franks into battle; and his deep raid into central Palestine in September 1184 had not perceptibly weakened them. Saladin’s moves in June 1187 leave no doubt that this time he was resolved to force a full-scale, decisive battle.

Jewish Settlements in Galilee and Their Hideaway Systems (n.p., 1984), pp. 128-139 (in Hebrew).

- 4 RHC HOR. 4:286-287. The letter was sent “from Ascalon”—i.e., from the Muslim army that was besieging that town. Ascalon surrendered on 5 September 1187.
- 5 On the Ḥanbalī exodus see Emmanuel Sivan, “Refugiés syro-palestiniens au temps des Croisades,” *Revue des études islamiques* 35 (1967), 135-147 and Joseph Drory, “Hanbalīs of the Nablus Region in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” *Asian and African Studies* 22 (1988), 92-112. For information on Muwaffaq al-Dīn and his work see Henri Laoust, *Le précis de droit d’Ibn Qudāma* (Beirut, 1950), pp. ix-xlii; and Drory, “Hanbalīs,” p. 104. It should be noted that Abū Shāma refers also to Ibn Shaddād without mentioning his *laqab* (honorific title), Bahā‘ al-Dīn: RHC HOR. 4:280. Cf. Dominique Sourdel, “Deux documents relatifs à la communauté ḥanbalite de Damas,” *Bulletin d’études orientales* 25 (1972), 142-143.

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
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I. Roads and springs in eastern Lower Galilee, 1187 (use of contours base by permission of Survey of Israel)

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On 18 Rabī II 583/27 June 1187, a Saturday, Saladin reached al-Uqḥuwāna, at the southern end of Lake Tiberias, and set up camp near the village of Sinnabra, the site of a ruined Umayyad castle. On Tuesday, 21 Rabī II/30 June, he moved northwestward to the village of Kafr Sabt, leaving his heavy baggage in al-Uqḥuwāna. The first date is derived from the account of 'Imād al-Dīn, the second is given by Bahā' al-Dīn, who also mentions the encampment near Sinnabra; the place name Kafr Sabt and the detail that Saladin moved to this village without his heavy baggage are supplied by al-Muqaddasī.⁶

Kafr Sabt—a village that belonged to the abbey of Mount Tabor, and the place of origin of one of its turcoples⁷—lies near the eastern edge of a sizable plateau, just to the south of the main road that, at least from Late Bronze times onward, linked Acre with the Jordan Valley and Transjordan (see fig. 1).⁸ Southeast of Kafr Sabt, this road runs along Wādī Fidjdjās, which provides the most gradual descent to the Jordan in the region. Climbing the road from the Jordan, it is at Kafr Sabt that one gets one's first view of the plateau as well as of Mount Tabor, the mountains northeast of Nazareth, Mount Ṭur'ān, and the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn. The terrain west and northwest of Kafr Sabt is easy to traverse, with the main road running toward Acre through broad valleys or plains. About 2 kilometers east of Kafr Sabt, a road—possibly a Roman one—branches off the main Acre-Transjordan road and leads northeastward to Tiberias. Saladin most probably advanced to Kafr Sabt by the road ascending along Wādī Fidjdjās; in any case, it could have served him for a speedy retreat to the Jordan Valley. At Kafr Sabt, Saladin had an ample supply of water: the large springs in Wādī Fidjdjās, the waters of which were carried in antiquity to Tiberias by aqueduct, were easily accessible;⁹ water could also be hauled from the Jordan; and there is a small perennial spring just northeast of the village. By occupying Kafr Sabt, Saladin controlled one of the roads leading from the Frankish camp

- 6 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, *Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Ṣalāh al-Dīn*, ed. Carlo de Landberg (Leiden, 1888), p. 20, French trans. Henri Massé (Paris, 1972), p. 22; Bahā' al-Dīn in RHC HOR. 3:93 and in Abū Shāma, RHC HOR. 4:282; al-Muqaddasī in Abū Shāma, RHC HOR. 4:286. On the site of the encampment see L.A. Mayer, "Aṣ-Ṣinnabra," *Eretz-Israel* 1 (Jerusalem, 1951), 169-170 (in Hebrew).
- 7 For the sources mentioning the *casale* Capharseth see Gustav Beyer, "Die Kreuzfahrergebiete Akko und Galilaea," *ZDPV* 67 (1944-45), 218. The turcople Petrus de Cafarset (or Capharset) is mentioned in 1163 and 1180: Delaville, *Carulaire*, 2:905, 909.
- 8 Aapeli Saarisalo, "Topographical Researches in Galilee," *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society* 9 (1929), 30-36, and 10 (1937), 7; Bustenay 'Oded, "Darb al-ḥawarneḥ—An Ancient Route," *Eretz-Israel* 10 (Jerusalem, 1971), 191-197 (in Hebrew).
- 9 See Zalman S. Winogradov, "The Ancient Aqueduct of Tiberias," in D. 'Amit, Y. Hirschfeld, and J. Patrich, eds., *The Aqueducts of Ancient Palestine: Collected Essays* (Jerusalem, 1989), pp. 123-132 (in Hebrew). Discharge measurements of the springs in Wādī Fidjdjās are available for some dates from 1928 onward. For instance, the discharge measured on 16 July 1946, amounted to 0.061 m³/sec.—that is, 219,600 liters per hour. Palestine, Department of Land Settlement and Water Commissioner, Irrigation Service, *Water Measurements 1945/46* (Jerusalem, 1947), p. 162. I would like to thank Mr. Yig'āl Cohen, of Ramat Ha-Sharōn, for his help with matters hydrological.

at Saffūriya/Saforie to Tiberias and could easily strike at either destination.¹⁰ The stretch of the more northerly Roman road to Tiberias which extends from the village of Tur‘ān via Kh. Maskana to Lūbiya/Lubie is not visible from Kafr Sabt; but Saladin probably sent a part of his huge army to Lūbiya/Lubie, just 4 kilometers of easy ascent northwest of Kafr Sabt, to gain thereby direct control of that road too.¹¹

Saladin, so relates al-Muqaddasī, stayed at Kafr Sabt for two days—that is, until 23 Rabī II/2 July. The well-informed, anonymous author of the *Libellus de expugnatione Terrae Sanctae* reports that the Muslim troops roamed throughout the region, from Tiberias to Bethsan and Nazareth, setting everything on fire; they also ascended Mount Tabor and desecrated the sanctuary at its summit.¹² Saladin himself rode westward to the Springs of Saforie to lure the Franks into battle but, predictably, failed; as in the Jezreel Valley in 1183, the Franks refused to budge. In a letter written about three months later, Saladin claims that he went on to search “in the plain of Lūbiya”—that is, near the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn—for a suitable battlefield that could accommodate both armies.¹³ Then, on Thursday, 23 Rabī II/2 July, Saladin descended on Tiberias and laid siege to it, evidently hoping to induce the Franks to leave the Springs of Saforie and come to the rescue of Galilee’s capital. One may surmise that siege equipment from al-Uḡhuwāna was brought up the western shore of Lake Tiberias. Saladin’s men soon breached the wall and occupied the town, and the lady of Tiberias, beleaguered in the citadel on the lake’s shore, sent a messenger to Saforie to call for help. King Guy, who must have remembered that the adoption of a defensive stance under similar circumstances in October 1183 had caused his ousting from office, and who might have needed some large-scale action to justify the hiring of mercenaries with money that Henry II of England had deposited in Jerusalem, finally made up his mind to march to Tiberias.¹⁴

It is reasonable to assume that the Franks, with their destination some 30 kilometers away, left Saforie early in the morning of 3 July, but the precise hour must remain conjectural. Also unclear is the route of the first part of their march to Tiberias. The layout of the ancient roads in the vicinity of Saforie has not yet

10 Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin*, p. 256.

11 Since ‘Imād al-Dīn reports that before the assault on Tiberias the Muslims passed the night on the plain of Lūbiya (‘Imād al-Dīn, *Conquête*, ed. Landberg, p. 105, French trans. Massé, p. 95, German trans. in Jörg Kraemer, *Der Sturz des Königreichs Jerusalem [583/1187] in der Darstellung des ‘Imād ad-Dīn al-Kātib al-Isfahānī* [Wiesbaden, 1952], p. 14), and since Ibn Shaddād writes that Saladin camped on a mountain west of Tiberias (RHC HOR. 3:93), Herde concluded that on 30 June Saladin moved from al-Uḡhuwāna via Kafr Sabt to Lūbiya: Herde (note 2 above), p. 13. The explicit statement by al-Muqaddasī should however be preferred.

12 RHC HOR. 4:286; *De expugnatione Terrae Sanctae libellus*, ed. J. Stevenson, RS 66 (London, 1875), p. 219.

13 ‘Imād al-Dīn, *Conquête*, ed. Landberg, p. 105, trans. Massé, p. 95, trans. Kraemer, p. 14.

14 For reconstructions of Guy’s reasoning see R.C. Smail, “The Predicaments of Guy of Lusignan, 1183-87,” in *Outremer*, pp. 159-176; Hans E. Mayer, “Henry II of England and the Holy Land,” *English Historical Review* 97 (1982), 721-739; Geoffrey Regan, *Saladin and the Fall of Jerusalem* (London, 1987), pp. 110-114.

been conclusively established. The main Roman road from Tiberias westward has been traced to a spot about 3 kilometers northeast of Saforie. Near this spot, the inner width of the road amounts to 10.40 meters; the overall width of the road, including curbstones, to 13.20 meters; and the width of the embankment to 15.80 meters. No other road of Roman Palestine is known to have been that wide. A milestone found at this spot indicates a distance of 2 miles to Diocaesarea (i.e., Zippōrī/Saffūriya/Saforie) and we may therefore assume that there existed also a road between that milestone and Saforie. In addition, remains have been found of an ancient—possibly Roman—road that by-passed Saforie from the northwest, and of another road that ascended through hilly ground from Saforie east-southeast to Mashhad (see fig. 1). No ancient remains have been spotted along the alternative route from the Springs of Saforie to Mashhad suggested by Praver, which first follows the dry bed of Wādī Malik/Naḥal Zippōrī and then ascends northeastward to Mashhad.¹⁵ In general, one should not overemphasize the importance of roads for Frankish or Muslim field armies, for as R.C. (‘Otto’) Smail had judiciously remarked, these armies “were not dependent upon supplies brought up by wheeled vehicles from a base, and so were not limited to the use of certain roads.”¹⁶ Indeed, the report of the Old French continuations of William of Tyre that the serjeants of the Frankish army captured, tortured and burnt an old Saracen woman at the distance of 2 *lieues* from Nazareth apparently supports the view that the Franks did take the more difficult route from the Springs of Saforie to Mashhad, for Mashhad is situated about 2 leagues northeast of Nazareth.¹⁷ However, the distances noted by medieval chroniclers are all too often rough approximations, so the 2 leagues must not be taken at face value. It is at least as plausible to assume that the Franks, with a long march before them, gave preference to the much easier and only fractionally longer route that led from the Springs of Saforie northward to the wide Roman road, and then eastward along it.

In any case, Muslim scouts observed the Frankish advance. Saladin, then directing the siege of the citadel of Tiberias, was notified and immediately moved westward; we do not know whether via Kafr Sabt or Lūbiya. His men began to harass the Franks. In the letter first utilized by Lyons and Jackson, Saladin relates that at noon the Franks “took one of the waters by marching to it and turning aside” but, contrary to their best interests, “left the water and set

15 Praver, *Crusader Institutions*, p. 491.

16 R.C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare (1097-1193)* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 204.

17 *Cont. WT*, p. 47; *Eracles*, p. 54. Ernoul, p. 163, does not mention the distance. A *lieue* (*leuga*) equals 2,222 meters: Albert Grenier, *Manuel d’archéologie gallo-romaine, 2: L’archéologie du sol: Les routes* (Paris, 1934), pp. 95-96. The Old French passage is discussed by Praver, *Crusader Institutions*, p. 49, note 28, who also mentions that Raymond of Tripoli argued that between Saforie and Tiberias there is only the small spring of Cresson (Ernoul, p. 159). However, this spring is only about one kilometer closer to Mashhad than to the Roman road. If indeed the Franks chose to traverse the broken ground to Mashhad, one may speculate that they did not there turn northeastward to Kafr Kanna but continued north-northeast along a route dotted by several small springs, Cresson being one of them (Yossi Buchman’s suggestion).

out towards Tiberias." Lyons and Jackson assume that the spring in question was that of Ṭur'ān.¹⁸ This is indeed plausible, as that spring lies less than 3 kilometers north of the road presumably taken by the Franks; in fact, Praver, writing before Saladin's letter became known, saw fit to explain why the Franks had passed so close to the spring of Ṭur'ān without taking advantage of its waters.¹⁹ How should we best interpret King Guy's decision to leave the spring and continue the march eastward—a decision that Saladin considered a blatant mistake? Lyons and Jackson believe that Guy's advance eastward was a mere probe; if the Muslims were to attack from their main camp near Kafr Sabt, the Franks would be able to pin them against the north-south ridge situated east of the village of Ṭur'ān; if the Muslims were to stay at Kafr Sabt, and their position would appear to be unassailable, the Franks could return to the spring of Ṭur'ān and neutralize Saladin's threat to the citadel of Tiberias by repeated thrusts in the direction of the main Muslim camp. The probe was tactically sound, but it failed because Guy was not aware of the vastness of the Muslim forces. Numerical superiority allowed Saladin to hold the ridge as well as send his two wings to the spring of Ṭur'ān, seize it, and prevent the Franks from retreating to it. According to Lyons and Jackson, it was this move that won Saladin the battle.²⁰

This is an ingenious reconstruction, based almost entirely on an assessment of the terrain and the opportunities it offered the opposing armies. A simpler solution is suggested by discharge measurements of the springs of Saforie, Ḥaṭṭīn, and Ṭur'ān in recent times. Of course, it would be rash to assume that spring yields in Galilee remained constant between the twelfth century and the present, but there are reasons to suppose that the relative importance of the various springs did not change markedly. Thus the Springs of Saforie, at which the Frankish army assembled on several occasions, are the most abounding in Lower Galilee: one of them, 'Eyn Zippōrī/'Ayn al-Qaṣṭal, yielded no less than 108,000 liters per hour on 7 August 1949, and 86,400 liters per hour on 13 July 1950. The two springs at the village of Ḥaṭṭīn, "ou il a eve de fontaines à grant planté" according to the *Eracles*, and which the Franks presumably attempted to reach at a later stage of their advance on Tiberias, also supply a considerable quantity of water: on 4 July 1949, it amounted to 33,840 liters per hour, and on 20 July 1950, to 17,280 liters per hour.²¹ The discharge of other springs in the

18 Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin*, p. 259. For the text see the article by Melville and Lyons in the present volume.

19 Praver, *Crusader Institutions*, p. 493. Another possibility is that Saladin's letter refers to the springs of Ḥaṭṭīn; but the account in the letter does not tie in with the description of the struggle for those springs given in one of the Old French continuations of William of Tyre, to be discussed below.

20 Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin*, pp. 259-261. The authors do not explain, though, why Guy did not leave behind a force to guard the spring; cf. Hannes Möhring, "Saladins Politik des Heiligen Krieges," *Der Islam* 61 (1984), 325.

21 Israel, Ministry of Agriculture, Water Department, Hydrological Service, *Hydrological Year-Book of Israel, 1947/48-1949/50* (Jerusalem, 1950), pp. 483 ('Ayn al-Qaṣṭal), 526

region is far more limited. Thus Mary's Fountain in Nazareth yielded about 4,000 liters per hour in the spring of 1918, and just one-fourth of that toward the end of the dry season.²² Yield data for most other springs are not available, since their meager discharges have not been deemed important enough to warrant measurement.²³ This is true of the spring of Cresson, described by Raymond of Tripoli as "une petite fontaine,"²⁴ and of 'Ayn Ṭur'ān (or 'Ayn al-Balad), situated in the mountains about 1.5 kilometers northwest of the village of Ṭur'ān. On 12 July 1989, Shim'on Mishqal of the Tiberias Bureau of the Israel Hydrological Service kindly agreed to measure for me the discharge of 'Ayn Ṭur'ān, on which no earlier data were available. The discharge amounted to 180 liters per hour, a mere fraction of that of the springs of Saforie or Ḥaṭṭīn.²⁵ One may surmise, therefore, that the spring above Ṭur'ān, while able to quell the thirst of a number of Franks on 3 July 1187, was insufficient to sustain an army numbering many thousands of men and horses. Whatever King Guy's blunders, the move from Ṭur'ān was hardly one of them.

The bulk of the Frankish army appears to have managed to advance only about 3 or 4 kilometers east of Ṭur'ān. The letter utilized by Lyons and Jackson relates that Saladin sent his nephew Taqī al-Dīn, as well as Muẓaffar al-Dīn, to seize "the water" (presumably Ṭur'ān); and al-Muqaddasī writes that Taqī al-Dīn commanded the Muslim right wing, Muẓaffar al-Dīn the left, and Saladin himself the center. It seems reasonable to assume, then—as do Lyons and Jackson—that the two wings made their way to "the water" around the Frankish army.²⁶ It follows that from this point the Franks were virtually surrounded. Indeed, this is what al-Muqaddasī explicitly states, adding that the Muslim center was behind the Franks. The *Libellus de expugnatione Terrae Sanctae* relates that the Templars in the rear came under a crushing Turkish attack.²⁷ These last two pieces of information tie in to indicate that the Templars in the Frankish rear had to bear the brunt of the attacking Muslim center under Saladin. The clash of Muslim center and Frankish rear suggests that the Muslims were charging from the high ground in the south against the Franks, who were

('Ayn Ḥaṭṭīn), 527 ('Ayn al-Nabī Shu'ayb). Of the measurements available, I chose those closest to 3 July; the original data are in m³/sec. For the quotation, see *Eracles*, p. 62.

22 Paul Range, *Nazareth, Das Land der Bibel*, 4.2 (Leipzig, 1923), p. 12. Dr. Range, while serving in the German army during World War I, unearthed a spring in the western part of the town that yielded 500 liters per hour.

23 See Sophia Schmorak and M.J. Goldschmidt, "Springs," in *Atlas of Israel* (Jerusalem and Amsterdam, 1970), Sheet 5.2 (Hydrology).

24 Ernoul, p. 159.

25 The discharge of 'Ayn al-Nabī Shu'ayb does not appear to have changed much between 1949 and 1988: both on 2 September 1949, and on 12 December 1988, it amounted to 18,000 liters per hour. For the first datum see *Hydrological Year-Book* (note 21 above), p. 527; for the second I am indebted again to Mr. Mishqal.

26 For Saladin's letter see pp. 216-220 below; al-Muqaddasī in Abū Shāma, RHC HO. 4:286; Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* (note 2 above), p. 261.

27 al-Muqaddasī, p. 287 (I would like to thank my colleague Etan Kohlberg for having clarified for me the meaning of this and other Arabic passages). *Libellus* (note 12 above), pp. 222-223.

advancing eastward along the valley of Ṭur'ān—'Imād al-Dīn indeed reports that, before the attack, the Muslims saw the Franks from above²⁸—and that by the time the Muslim center launched its attack, the Frankish van and center were already east of the area where the clash was to take place.

According to the *Libellus*, the van under Raymond of Tripoli advanced close to the steep descent to Lake Tiberias. Raymond urged the king to go ahead swiftly so that the army might fight its way to the water. The king promised to do so but, because of the Turkish pressure on the Frankish rear, suddenly changed his mind and gave orders to encamp on the spot. Raymond considered this decision a fatal mistake: a vigorous push to the lake could have saved the army, encampment on the arid plateau made its defeat inevitable. On the other hand, one version of the Old French continuation of William of Tyre relates that it was Raymond who believed it to be impossible to reach Tiberias on that day and therefore advised the king to turn left, descend to the village of Habatin (i.e., Ḥaṭṭīn) and its springs, and continue to Tiberias on the following day. But the turn to the left brought the Franks into disarray, and the Turks succeeded in seizing the springs ahead of them.²⁹ Other Old French versions claim that in view of the Turkish pressure, Raymond advised the king to set up camp on the plateau.³⁰ All Old French versions brand Raymond's advice a *mauvais conseil*, and report that men who had participated in the campaign were of the opinion that if the Franks had gone on the attack at this juncture they could have defeated the Turks. Thus both the *Libellus* and the Old French versions believe that the Franks should have pressed on to Tiberias; they differ in that the *Libellus* holds the king guilty of aborting the attack whereas the Old French versions lay the blame on Raymond. Perhaps neither of these two old rivals acted resolutely enough at the crucial moment and mutual recriminations began immediately thereafter.

The Old French version which reports that the Franks failed in their attempt to reach the springs of Ḥaṭṭīn goes on to relate that they stopped on the summit of a mountain called Carnehatin (i.e., the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn), that Raymond advised setting up camp there, and that the king accepted his advice. This account—which contrasts starkly with all reliable descriptions of the battle that took place the following day—ought to be dismissed. The *Libellus* on the other hand relates that the Frankish advance on 3 July came to a halt at a *casale* called

28 'Imād al-Dīn, *Conquête*, ed. Landberg, p. 106, trans. Massé, p. 96; see also ed. Landberg, p. 23, trans. Massé, p. 25.

29 *Libellus*, p. 223; *Eracles*, pp. 62-63. The account in this version of the *Eracles* is partially corroborated by the one discovered by Jean Richard in Vat. Reg. lat. 598, which states that "eadem die nostri gessere fortius ubique; aquam preoccupatam ab hostibus perdiderunt": Jean Richard, "An Account of the Battle of Hattin Referring to the Frankish Mercenaries in Oriental Moslem States," *Speculum* 27 (1952), 175; for a different wording see Robert d'Auxerre, *Chronicon*, ed. O. Holder-Egger (1882), MGH SS 26:249. See also 'Imād al-Dīn, *Conquête*, ed. Landberg, p. 23, trans. Massé, p. 25.

30 *Eracles*, MS C, pp. 60-61; Ernoul, pp. 167-168; *Cont. WT*, p. 52.

Marescalcia;³¹ and it stands to reason that the Franks spent the night of 3 July at this place, since in an act drawn up only a few weeks later the remaining leaders of the Frankish Kingdom mentioned that the defeat of 4 July took place *supra manescalciam Tyberiadis*.³²

Prawer argued convincingly that Marescalcia/Manescalcia should be identified with Talmudic *Mashkena* and Arabic *Maskana*.³³ In modern times, *Maskana* has been a ruin. But the Ottoman cadastral register of 1555-56 lists it as a village, and that of 1596-97 discloses that it was then inhabited by 47 families; accordingly, it was similar in size to Ṭur'ān but much smaller than nearby Lūbiya, which numbered 182 families.³⁴ There are grounds therefore for believing that the reference of the *Libellus* to Marescalcia as a *casale*, or village, is accurate, and that the place was indeed inhabited in 1187. Prawer assumed that Marescalcia was situated on a secondary road leading northeastward to the village of Ḥaṭṭīn. However, in the early 1980s, a stretch of the main Roman road in the region, linking Acre with Tiberias, was (re)discovered north of the modern highway, just 300 meters south of *Khīrbat Maskana*. The stretch is visible in several aerial photographs—as in that taken on 4 March 1961 (fig. 2). The main Roman road intersects with a local north-south road of the same period (see arrow D on fig. 2); at the crossroads, the inner width of the main road amounts to 5.80 meters, the overall width inclusive of curbstones to 6.60 meters, and the width of the embankment to 10.30 meters. East of the crossroads, the main road contains many basalt plates fitted together (fig. 3). West of the crossroads, between the main road and *Khīrbat Maskana*, is a pool—*Birkat Maskana*—originally a crater. About 40 by 40 meters in extent, it is surrounded by large basalt stones, with traces of a water inlet at the northeastern corner (see figs. 2 and 4). A Roman milestone, now in the museum of Kibbutz Deganya Beth, was found close to it.³⁵

31 *Eracles*, p. 63; *Libellus*, p. 223.

32 Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, ed., *Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova*, vol. 2 (Rome, 1938), Doc. 170, p. 318. Röhrich believes that the act dates from the end of July 1187: RRR 659.

33 Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, pp. 489-490.

34 For *Maskana* in the register of 1555-56 see H. Rhode, "The Geography of the Sixteenth-Century Sancak of Ṣafad," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 10 (1985), 199; Rhode does not provide details on population. According to the register of 1596-97 there were 47 heads of families (plus one unmarried man) in *Maskana*, 48 in Ṭur'ān, 29 in *Kafr Sabt*, 182 (plus 32 unmarried men) in Lūbiya, 86 (plus 24) in Ḥaṭṭīn, and 366 (plus 34) in Ṣaffūriya: Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth and Kamal Abdulfattah, *Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the Late 16th Century* (Erlangen, 1977), pp. 187 (Lūbiya), 188 (Ṣaffūriya, *Kafr Sabt*, Ṭur'ān), 189 (*Maskana*), 190 (Ḥaṭṭīn). Quaresmius speaks of "Meschina villula, re et nomine:" Francisus Quaresmius, *Elucidatio Terrae Sanctae*, 2 (Antwerp, 1631), p. 856a.

35 The most detailed description of *Birkat Maskana* is that by Gustaf Dalman in his "Jahresbericht des Instituts für das Arbeitsjahr 1913/14," *Palästina-Jahrbuch des Deutschen Evangelischen Instituts für Altertumswissenschaft des heiligen Landes zu Jerusalem* 10 (1914), 41. I am indebted to Israel Roll for the data on the Roman roads; see also Teper and *Shahar*, *Jewish Settlements* (note 3 above), pp. 129-130.




Fig. 2. Aerial photo of Roman road near Khirbat Maskana, 4 March 1961 (Survey of Israel, S. 49, photo 0407)

A-C: Roman road; B-C: modern road; D: intersection of two Roman roads; M: Kh. Maskana

It follows that during the night of 3 July the Franks were encamped on or near the Roman road to Tiberias. Birkat Maskana was probably already in existence—Gustaf Dalman assumed that it originated in an “*uralte Zeit*”—but is it reasonable to assume that it contained water that late in the year? Two guidebooks, compiled at a time when travelers and troopers depended on information about water almost as much as in the Middle Ages, suggest that it is. Baedeker’s guidebook of 1912 refers to “the ruins and water-basin of Birket Meskana”; and the *Handbook on Northern Palestine and Southern Syria*, printed in Cairo in April 1918 by General Allenby’s intelligence officers in preparation for the British drive on Nazareth and Damascus, says: “Birket Meskeneh, large rain-water pool is passed to r.; it generally contains water, which is used only for




Fig. 3. Main Roman road east of crossroads (photo by author)

animals.”³⁶ Aerial photographs indicate that the pool was full of water on 26 January 1945, and nearly so on 4 March 1961 (see fig. 2), but that on 13 July 1963 it was dry.³⁷ So it was when visited on 8 June 1989 (see fig. 4). Yet it is possible that when Maskana was still inhabited, the pool was carefully maintained and contained some water even at the beginning of July. The same goes for the six large, rock-hewn cisterns on the northern, northwestern, and southern slopes of Kh. Maskana. In fact, ‘Imād al-Dīn (and Ibn al-Athīr) relate that the Franks emptied the reservoirs of the vicinity.³⁸ Whatever water they found there certainly did not suffice, for most sources stress the thirst endured that night by the Franks. But, given the constraint of having to set up camp on the plateau, the choice of Maskana appears more sensible than hitherto supposed.³⁹

36 Karl Baedeker, *Palestine and Syria* (Leipzig, 1912), p. 252; *Handbook on Northern Palestine and Southern Syria*, first provisional edition (Cairo, 9 April 1918), p. 186; also, p. 202. The *Handbook* mentions also that to the right of the Tiberias-Nazareth road “a stretch of the Roman road is well preserved for two or three hundred yards” (p. 186).

37 Palestine Survey, Strip 19, photo 6133 (1945); Survey of Israel, Strip 49, photo 0407 (1961), and Strip 77, photo 2023 (1963). The photographs are kept at the Aerial Photographs Unit of the Hebrew University’s Department of Geography. I would like to thank Dr. Dov Gavish, who heads this unit, for having repeatedly placed these and other photographs at my disposal, and for having granted permission to reproduce the 1961 photo.

38 ‘Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, RHC HOR. 4:267; Ibn al-Athīr in RHC HOR. 1:683.

39 The *Hydrological Year-Book* (note 21 above), p. 481, mentions a spring near Birkat




Fig. 4. Birkat Maskana from southeast (photo by author)

During the night, the Muslims tightened their encirclement. Saladin's main camp appears to have been at Lūbiya, about 2 kilometers southeast of Maskana. Unlike the Franks, the Muslims had at their disposal all the water they needed, hauled on camelback from the lake. Large quantities of arrows were distributed among the archers in preparation for the expected battle.⁴⁰

On the morning of 4 July/25 Rabī' II, a Saturday, the Franks resumed their march. What was their objective? Did they head northeast trying to reach the springs of Ḥaṭṭīn, as they had done the day before according to one of the Old French versions, or did they march eastward to the lake?⁴¹ Three Muslim writers—al-Muqaddasī, 'Imād al-Dīn, and Ibn al-Aṭhīr—state explicitly that the Franks headed for the lake and that Saladin was determined to prevent them from doing so, whereas the Latin sources interpreted as referring to an advance to the springs may also be understood as indicating a march to the lake.⁴² True,

Maskana, found dry on 19 July 1950. But Yossi Buchman and Naphtali Madar of the Allon Tabor Field School are not aware of the spring's existence.

40 'Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, RHC HOR. 4:266. After the conquest of Tiberias, on his way to Acre, Saladin camped near Lūbiya (ibid., p. 293).

41 For the first view see Praver, *Crusader Institutions*, pp. 496-497; for the second, Herde, "Kämpfe," pp. 30-33, and Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin*, p. 262.

42 al-Muqaddasī in Abū Shāma, RHC HOR. 4:287; 'Imād al-Dīn, *Conquête*, ed. Landberg, p. 107, trans. Massé, p. 96, trans. Kraemer, p. 17; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, RHC HOR. 1:683. See also 'Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, RHC HOR. 4:267. The important letter to Archumbald relates that "ivit rex cum exercitu suo a Naim quasi leugam unam." *Historia de expeditione Friderici*, ed. A. Chroust (1928), MGH Scr. rer. germ., NS 5:2. But even if

the distance from Maskana to the springs is less than half that to the lake, and in view of the thirst of men and horses this difference might have rendered an advance to the springs more attractive. But as noted earlier, an Old French version relates that the Muslims seized the springs on the preceding day; and if that was so, it stands to reason that they continued to occupy the springs and their approaches. Even if we choose to discard this testimony, it is plausible to assume that Saladin would have countered any Frankish move toward the springs by occupying the approaches from the direction of the plateau and by posting a force at the springs themselves. To reach the springs, the Franks would first have had to overcome the Muslims guarding the approaches, then ride down the slope unprotected by their foot soldiers—who would not have been able to keep pace with them—and finally overwhelm the Muslim archers massed around the springs. Most of these hazards might have been reduced by taking the slightly longer route to the springs that leads from *Kh.* Maskana northward and then skirts Nimrīn from the northwest; but it is clear from the sources that the Franks did not choose this route. The march to the lake, on the other hand, would have denied the Muslims knowledge of the Franks' precise target, as the waterfront could be reached at several points. Besides, the march might have afforded the Franks an opportunity to launch a full-scale charge against the main body of the Muslim army, a charge of the kind that had given them victory on previous occasions. On balance, therefore, the explicit statements of the Muslim writers—two of them eyewitnesses—should be given credence.

Three Old French versions relate that, in the morning, the Muslims drew backward, refraining from battle until the heat became oppressive.⁴³ It is therefore plausible to assume that Saladin decided to position his men somewhat west of the main Palestinian watershed, which runs, in the area in question, from the heights of Nimrīn to Hill 311 (today the site of Kibbutz Lavī) and then to Lūbiya (see fig. 1). By holding this line Saladin would have blocked the road to Tiberias, covered the approaches to the springs of Ḥaṭṭīn, and compelled the Franks to fight with the Muslims occupying the high ground. Accordingly, the Franks would have been able to advance some two kilometers east, and uphill, of Maskana, with Muslim archers presumably attempting to slow them down. The problem with this reconstruction is that, in order to reach the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn, the main body of the Frankish army must have crossed the watershed at some point, i.e., dislodged the Muslims from their purported position—and none of our sources indicates that the Franks scored such an initial success.⁴⁴

Naim (or Nam) refers to the village of Nimrīn, the sentence would not mean that the king marched one league more to Nimrīn; rather, that he marched to a point about one league from Nimrīn. A league—i.e. 2.2 kilometers—southeast of Nimrīn brings us to the plateau southwest of the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn: Herde, p. 32, note 172.

43 Ernoul, p. 168; *Eracles*, pp. 62, 64.

44 I would like to thank Mr. Shāhar Shapira for having pointed out to me the possible importance of the watershed and the other 'dominating lines' in the area. In the future, we intend to apply his "dominating lines method" to the final stage of the battle.

I believe it is impossible to establish the exact sequence of events during the ensuing battle. Two Latin sources—the letter to Archumbald as well as the less reliable letter of the Genoese consuls—insist that the battle began with a Templar attack that failed disastrously because the other contingents did not support it. If accepted at face value, this would indicate that Frankish coordination was inadequate from the start. However, the author of the *Libellus* mentions a similar event much later in the battle. He relates that while the king and the bishops pleaded with the foot soldiers to descend from the mountain to which they had fled (i.e., the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn), the Templars, Hospitallers, and turcoples came under unbearable pressure and appealed for the king's support. The king, however, seeing that the knights stood no chance against the Turkish arrows without the foot soldiers' help, ordered the pitching of tents.⁴⁵ The similarity between the accounts argues against the possibility that they refer to two distinct events; the difference between them renders questionable the assertion that the battle began with a Templar attack. As for the battle's end, few historians have been able to withstand the temptation to wind up their reconstruction with Ibn al-Aṭhīr's dramatic description of two successive Frankish downhill charges repulsed by two successive Muslim counterattacks that drove the Franks back up to the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn, the second counterdrive culminating in the overthrow of King Guy's tent, which marked the Frankish rout. Ibn al-Aṭhīr relies on the eyewitness account of Saladin's son al-Afḍal. But a more mature eyewitness, 'Imād al-Dīn, relates that after their cavalry charges had been repulsed, the Franks dismounted and continued to fight on foot. When the Muslims captured the True Cross, the Franks knew that they were beaten; the king was captured somewhat later.⁴⁶

So much for the battle's beginning and end. Regarding the rest, there is considerable agreement as to the main events—the scrub fire started by the Muslims, the escape of Raymond of Tripoli, the ascent to the horns—but not as to their sequence or cause. Hence the striking divergences among modern attempts at reconstruction. I have chosen to call attention to the range of variance in descriptions of the episodes, and some of their implications, rather than to constrain them into one out of several plausible narratives.

Most sources relate that the Muslims started a heath fire, which added to the hardships of the thirsty and weary Franks. The *Libellus* states that the fire was started during the night of 3 July; one Old French version has it that the fire was started, on Saladin's orders, during the morning of 4 July; the letter of the Genoese consuls mentions the fire occurring after the failure of the Frankish attack; 'Imād al-Dīn places it after the escape of Raymond of Tripoli; and the

45 See the letter to Archumbald referred to in note 42 above, p. 2. The letter of the Genoese consuls has been published twice: *Gesta regis Henrici secundi*, ed. W. Stubbs, RS 49 (London, 1867), 2:11-13; and Karl Hampe, "Ein ungedruckter zeitgenössischer Bericht über die Schlacht bei Hattin," *Neues Archiv* 22 (1897), 278-280. *Libellus*, p. 225.

46 Ibn al-Aṭhīr in RHC HOR. 1:685-686; 'Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, RHC HOR. 4:270, 274. See also Saladin's letter, pp. 216-220 below.

letter of Archumbald relates that the Turks set fires around the Frankish army when it attempted to encamp near the horns.⁴⁷ It is of course possible that the Muslims set the scrub on fire on more than one occasion. It was certainly a simple and effective means of harassment. Johann Ludwig Burckhardt, the well-known traveler who passed near the horns on 23 June 1812, helps to impart its efficacy:

I was several times reprimanded by my guide, for not taking proper care of the lighted tobacco that fell from my pipe. The whole of the mountain is thickly covered with dry grass, which readily takes fire, and the slightest breath of air instantly spreads the conflagration far over the country, to the great risk of the peasants' harvest. The Arabs who inhabit the valley of the Jordan invariably put to death any person who is known to have been even the innocent cause of firing the grass.⁴⁸

Variance regarding the stage at which Raymond's escape took place is more limited but is compounded by the question of motive. The author of the *Libellus* claims that the men around Raymond decided to escape after they had been cut off from the main force under the king. The Old French versions on the other hand relate that Raymond went on the attack on the king's orders and that the Saracens opened ranks and let him through.⁴⁹ As for the ascent to the horns, the author of the *Libellus* accuses the foot soldiers of having made it early in the battle, on the approach of the Saracens. On the other hand, both the letter to Archumbald and an Old French version attribute to Raymond the advice that the entire army should encamp near or on the horns, while the Muslim sources report the ascent as taking place toward the end of the battle.⁵⁰

According to the letter to Archumbald, Raymond characterized the horns as "quasi castellum."⁵¹ Whether originating with Raymond or not, it is an apt characterization. Gal's archaeological survey has revealed that both horns are encircled by an Iron Age wall, and that the southern, somewhat higher horn is surrounded also by a Late Bronze wall.⁵² Impressive remains are visible to this day: In 1914, Dalman spoke of a "cyclopean wall" on the southern horn, of

47 *Libellus*, p. 223; *Cont. WT*, p. 52; *Gesta regis Henrici secundi*, p. 11; Hampe, "Bericht," p. 279; 'Imād al-Dīn in Abū Shāma, RHC HOR. 4:269; Letter to Archumbald, p. 2.

48 J.L. Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1822), p. 331. Burckhardt also relates that, "mounted [on] a mare that was not likely to excite the cupidity of the Arabs," he made the way from Tiberias via the horns to Kafr Kanna in four and a quarter hours; *ibid.*, pp. 311, 336.

49 *Libellus*, pp. 225-226; *Eracles*, p. 64; *Cont. WT*, p. 53; Ernoul, p. 69.

50 *Libellus*, pp. 224-225; Letter to Archumbald, p. 2; *Eracles*, p. 63; 'Imād al-Dīn, *Conquête*, ed. Landberg, p. 24, trans. Massé, p. 26; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, in RHC HOR. 1:685. See also Saladin's letter, below.

51 Letter to Archumbald, p. 2. See also the statement attributed to Raymond by Robert d'Auxerre and the account discovered by Jean Richard: "Preoccupanda suggerit esse montana, ut inde securius pugnet et hostes validius impetant." Robert d'Auxerre, *Chronicon*, p. 249; Richard, "Account," p. 175.

52 Z. Gal, "Tel Rekhes and Tel Qarney Ḥiṭṭīn," *Eretz-Israel* 15 (1981), 215, 218 (in Hebrew). See also his article in the present volume.

which a considerable part was 2.30 meters wide and 2 meters high,⁵³ and it is plausible to assume that in 1187 the remains were still more imposing. Thus, under the difficult circumstances of the final battle, the ascent to the horns made considerable military sense: the ancient walls provided some protection from Muslim arrows and allowed the Frankish archers to shoot at their enemies as if from the ramparts of a castle. It is likely that the Frankish knights regrouped in the large crater between the horns. The two downhill cavalry charges were most probably launched westward, through the only convenient exit from the crater.

Ibn al-Athīr's account leaves no doubt that both cavalry charges were aimed at the point where Saladin himself was.⁵⁴ Back in 1952, Jean Richard drew attention to the similarity between these charges and the stratagem that a knight named John suggested to King Guy at the beginning of the battle. According to an account preserved in Vat. Reg. lat. 598 and in the chronicle of Robert d'Auxerre, this knight—who had frequently fought in Muslim armies and was well versed in their mode of warfare—advised the king to attack with all his strength the compact body of Muslims around Saladin's banner, because once it was routed, the other contingents could be easily overcome. The similarity between this advice and the charges described by Ibn al-Athīr is indeed striking. Richard wrote that the plan proposed by the knight John almost gave victory to the Franks.⁵⁵ Perhaps, in fact, Ibn al-Athīr writes that the Frankish charges well-nigh succeeded in removing the Muslims from their positions.⁵⁶ At any rate, there is ample grounds for believing that arduous fighting continued long after Raymond's escape. The Frankish sources giving a different impression reflect accounts by participants who fled with Raymond or with Balian of Ibelin; the Muslim sources, which stress that the battle raged on until Saladin's men finally succeeded in ascending the horns, should be preferred.

Al-Muqaddasī saw fit to spell out the identity of the captors of King Guy and Renaud de Châtillon: the first, he relates, was captured by Dirbās the Kurd, the second by a servant (*ghulām*) of the amīr Ibrāhīm al-Mīhrānī. He does not mention the seizure of the True Cross at all. 'Imād al-Dīn, who does not give the captors' names, exhibits a better understanding of his enemies' sensibilities when he dwells at length on the importance of the Cross for Frankish morale and concludes that its capture weighed with the Franks more than that of the king.

About ten years earlier, on 25 November 1177, the Franks had decisively routed Saladin in the Battle of Montgisard; it was the day of Saint Catherine, and to commemorate their victory, the Franks had established the church of Sainte Katerine de Mongisart.⁵⁷ Now, after his own great victory, it was Saladin's turn

53 Dalman, "Jahresbericht" (note 35 above), p. 42.

54 RHC HOR. 1:685-686.

55 Richard, "Account," pp. 169-171, 175; Robert d'Auxerre, *Chronicon*, p. 249.

56 Ibn al-Athīr, RHC HOR. 1:684.

57 WT 21, 22, p. 922; *Les pèlerinages par aler en Iherusalem*, in *Itinéraires à Jérusalem et descriptions de la Terre Sainte rédigés en français aux XI^e, XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, ed. H.

to memorialize. The same Old French version which relates that upon the Christian defeat Saladin "rendi graces a Nostre Seigneur [*sic!*] del honor que il li avoit fait,"⁵⁸ tells also that he ordered the building of a *mahomerie* on the summit of the mountain on which King Guy had been captured.⁵⁹ The geographer al-Dimashqī (d. 1327) preserved the name of the structure. Having mentioned that the Franks were defeated at the Horns of Ḥaṭṭīn, he adds that Saladin built there a dome "which is called *qubbat al-naṣr*" (the Dome of Victory).⁶⁰ It did not remain intact for long. The German pilgrim Thietmar, who arrived in Acre in 1217, tells with glee that the temple Saladin had erected "to his gods" after the victory, is now desolate.⁶¹ The very nature of the edifice came to be forgotten: Quaresmius, in the early seventeenth century, saw on the summit ruins believed to be those of a church.⁶² The remains were correctly identified by Dalman in 1914,⁶³ and Gal excavated them in 1976 and 1981. But the few layers of stone, cleared of thistle a few days before the eight-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, are barely distinguishable by the untrained eye. Almost like the victory it once commemorated, the dome can be conjured up only by a feat of imagination.

Michelant and G. Raynaud (Geneva, 1882), p. 93; *Livre de Jean d'Ibelin*, c. 267, in RHC Lois 1:417. The causal link between victory and church was tentatively suggested by Charles Clermont-Ganneau, *Recueil d'archéologie orientale*, 1 (Paris, 1888), pp. 365-366. I believe that the link is obvious.

58 *Eracles*, p. 66, MS C, *ibid.*, p. 67; see also Ernoul, p. 172.

59 *Eracles*, p. 63.

60 *Cosmographie de Chams-ed-Din Abou Abdallah Mohammed ed-Dimichqui*, ed. A.F. Mehren (St. Petersburg, 1866), p. 212; English translation in Guy Le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems: A Description of Syria and the Holy Land from A.D. 650 to 1500* (London, 1890), p. 451.

61 "Hinc transivi per campum, ubi exercitus Christianorum victus fuit et crux sancta ab inimicis crucis capta. Ubi in medio campi in eminentia quadam Saladinus pro habita victoria diis suis templum edificavit, quod usque ad hodiernum diem ibi est, sine honore tamen et desolatum; nec mirum, quia non est solidatum supra firmam petram, qui est Christus Ihesus..." *Magistri Thietmari peregrinatio*, ed. J.C.M. Laurent (Hamburg, 1857), pp. 4-5.

62 "Sunt in eius summitate aedificionum ruinae: et creduntur esse alicuius Ecclesiae ad honorem Doctoris Christi aedificatae." Quaresmius, *Elucidatio* (note 34 above), p. 856a.

63 Dalman, "Jahresbericht" (note 25 above), p. 42, referring to al-Dimashqī and Thietmar.